| 李志宏,杨丽平,许小颖.基于区块链的虚拟知识社区内容生产投机行为仿真及治理对策研究[J].情报工程,2021,7(6):112-125 |
| 基于区块链的虚拟知识社区内容生产投机行为仿真及治理对策研究 |
| Research on Simulation and Governance Countermeasures of Content Production Speculative Behavior of VirtualKnowledge Community Based on Blockchain |
| |
| DOI：10.3772/j.issn.2095-915X.2021.06.010 |
| 中文关键词: 区块链；虚拟知识社区；投机行为；系统动力学 |
| 英文关键词: Blockchain; virtual knowledge community; speculative behavior; system dynamics |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目“区块链自治组织投票垄断分析及其动态治理机制研究——基于社会计算方法”（72171089）；广东省自然科学基金资助项目“基于区块链的大众创新社区知识共享治理机制研究”（2019A1515011370）；广州市哲学社会科学发展“十四五”规划课题资助项目“广州促进传统产业’上云用数赋智’研究——区块链驱动的产业数据联盟多方协同模式设计”（2021GZQN09）。 |
| 作者 | 单位 | | 李志宏 | 华南理工大学工商管理学院 广州 510641 | | 杨丽平 | 华南理工大学工商管理学院 广州 510641 | | 许小颖 | 华南理工大学工商管理学院 广州 510641 |
|
| 摘要点击次数: 1733 |
| 全文下载次数: 1129 |
| 中文摘要: |
| [ 目的/ 意义] 基于区块链技术的虚拟知识社区正在快速发展，其独特的通证激励机制一方面可以促进社区的知识共享行为，另一方面也会诱发内容创作者的投机行为。这种投机行为的具体表现是内容创作者通过创作低质量内容来获取通证，此现象会影响优质内容创作者的热情，不利于虚拟知识社区的健康发展。[ 方法/ 过程] 本文以区块链虚拟知识社区的典型代表——Steemit 社区为研究对象，构建社区内容生产投机行为的系统动力学仿真模型，探索通证激励机制的设计对投机行为的影响，以及投机行为的长期动态演变趋势。最后，基于仿真结果，本文提出相应治理措施，为同类区块链知识社区的机制设计提供思路。[ 结果/ 结论] 社区投机行为数量受到通证激励政策变化的显著影响，奖励知识分享比例、奖励内容发现比例、通证年通胀率、用户点踩所获收益均存在最优解范围。 |
| 英文摘要: |
| [Objective/significance] The current virtual knowledge community based on blockchain technology is developing vigorously. On the one hand, its unique token incentive mechanism can promote the knowledge sharing behavior of the community. On the other hand, it can also induce speculative behavior of content creators. The specific manifestation of this speculative behavior is that content creators obtain tokens by creating low-quality content. This phenomenon can affect the enthusiasm of high-quality content creators, and is not conducive to the healthy development of virtual knowledge communities.[Methods/process] This article takes the Steemit community, a typical representative of the blockchain virtual knowledge community as the research object, and constructs a system dynamics simulation model of speculative behavior of content production in community. The article explores the impact of the design of the token incentive mechanism on speculative behavior, and the long-term dynamic evolution of speculation. Lastly, based on the simulation results, this paper proposes the corresponding governance measures to provide ideas for the mechanism design of similar blockchain knowledge communities.[Results/conclusions] The number of speculative behaviors in community is significantly affected by the changes in the token incentive policy. The proportion of reward knowledge sharing, the ratio of reward content discovery, the annual inflation rate of the token, and the benefits of user downvotes all have an optimal solution range. |
|
查看全文
查看/发表评论 下载PDF阅读器 |
| 关闭 |
